We consider a discrete-time, generically incomplete market model and a behavioural investor with power-like utility and distortion functions. The existence of optimal strategies in this setting has been shown in [2] under certain conditions on the parameters of these power functions.
Introduction
This paper complements and improves results of [2] where the existence of an optimal strategy for an investor with behavioural criteria was proved under certain parameter restrictions (Assumption 2.3b below). Here we show the same result under different restrictions on the parameters (Assumption 2.3a) which are identical to the ones in [5] but they are neither stronger nor weaker than Assumption 2.3b. Assumption 2.3a is necessary and sufficient in certain continuous-time models (this is shown in [5] except a borderline case whose proof is yet unpublished). Furthermore, we manage to reprove the main result of [2] under somewhat weaker assumptions.
The key new ideas are imported from [5] and rely on the construction of an equivalent martingale measure for the price process whose density has nice integrability properties (see Lemma 3.1 below). It is this martingale measure that permits us to prove the tightness of an optimising sequence of strategies (Lemma 3.13 below), that's why we call our approach a dual one.
Model description
Fix an integer T > 0 acting as time horizon in the sequel and a filtered probability space Ω, F, {F t } t=0,...,T , P . We consider a financial market evolving in discrete time consisting of d risky assets whose discounted prices are given by an R d -valued adapted stochastic process, S = (S t ) t=0,...,T where S t = S 1 t , . . . , S d t . In addition, we are assuming the financial market to be liquid and frictionless, that is, all costs and constraints associated with transactions are non-existent, investors are allowed to short-sell stocks and to borrow money, and it is always possible to buy or sell an unlimited number of shares of any asset.
We denote by Ξ d t the set of d−dimensional F t −measurable random variables. Let W be the set of R-valued (or R d -valued) random variables Y such that E P |Y | p < ∞ for all p > 0.
Trading stategies are characterised by an initial capital z and a d-dimensional process {θ t : 1 t T } representing the holdings in the respective assets. We assume θ to be predictable, i.e. θ t ∈ Ξ d t−1 for all t. The class of all such strategies is denoted by Φ.
We define X z t (θ) := z + t k=1 θ k · ∆S k , the value process of a portfolio with initial investment z and trading strategy θ, where ∆S k := S k − S k−1 and · denotes scalar product. For x ∈ R the notations x + , x − stand for positive and negative parts, respectively.
We may and will assume κ t , β t 1 in the sequel. As pointed out in [2] , (1) is a strengthened form of the absence of arbitrage condition. We denote by M e (S) the set of equivalent martingale measures for S. Recall that, under the standard no arbitrage hypothesis, M e (S) = ∅, see e.g. [3] . Assumption 2.1 will allow us to construct a particular Q ∈ M e (S) with favourable properties, see Lemma 3.1 below. Now we turn to the description of an economic agent. Her attitude towards gains and loses will be described in terms of functions u + and u − . In addition, she will be assumed to distort the "real world" distributions (probabilities) by means of functions w + and w − . She will further have a "benchmark" or reference point B which is used when evaluating portfolio payoffs at the terminal time T . Assumption 2.2. We assume that u ± : R + → R + and w ± : [0, 1] → [0, 1] are measurable functions such that u ± (0) = 0, w ± (0) = 0, w ± (1) = 1, and
with α, β, γ, δ > 0, k ± , g ± > 0 fixed constants. 
Clearly, in Assumption 2.3b above, one of the two conditions α < β and α/γ < β subsumes the other, depending on whether γ > 1 or γ ≤ 1. An economic interpretation can easily be given to Assumption 2.4b. It means that the losses occurring in the behavioural investor's benchmark are comparable to the value of some self-financing portfolio.
Given a real-valued random variable X representing the outcome of an investment, a behavioural agent measures her satisfaction distorting the expected utility of profits as well as the expected "dissatisfaction" of losses. Consider the nonlinear functionals V + (X) and V − (X) defined below. Let
Notice that V + incorporates the utility of the investor on gains and w + produces a non-linear alteration of the given probability distribution. If w + (x) = x then we return to the expected utility framework since in this case V + (X) = Eu + (X − B) + . Similarly, let
and, finally, the objective or performance functional we aim to optimise is defined by
provided that at least one of the summands is finite. According to the cummulative prospective theory (CPT) developed in [4] and [7] , behavioural investors assess their satisfaction from a given portfolio at terminal time T by means of the functional defined in (11) and the benchmark B. So we define the functionals V + , V − below by
We say that a trading strategy θ ∈ Φ is admissible for initial capital z if V − (X z T (θ)) < ∞. We denote the set of such trading strategies by A (z) and define, for θ ∈ A(z),
The optimal portfolio problem for a behavioural investor consists in finding
Main results
As it is well known, most discrete-time market models are incomplete, i.e. M e (S) is not a singleton, hence the problem of how to choose a suitable equivalent martingale measure Q arises. Proof. We rely on [6] , which provides a utility maximisation framework where the existence of a martingale measure with desirable properties can be guaranteed. Define the continuously differentiable, concave function
The hypotheses of Proposition 7.1 in [6] hold by Assumption 2.1 and by (15), hence there is Q ∈ M e (S) such that
Inspecting the proof of Proposition 7.1 in [6] one can easily check that φ * t ∈ W for all t. Hence ρ ∈ W and ρ is bounded away from 0, a fortiori, 1/ρ ∈ W . We fix the probability Q just constructed for later use. It will be key in establishing moment estimates which underlie our main results. Note also that, under Assumption 2.4a, B ∈ L 1+ǫ (Q) for all 0 < ǫ < r by Hölder's inequality and ρ ∈ W .
We first address the well-posedness of the optimal portfolio problem for a behavioural investor. We say that the optimal investment problem (14) is well-posed if the supremum in (14) is finite. If the supremum is infinite then the problem is called ill-posed.
We know from section 3 of [2] that α/γ β/δ and α < β are necessary for wellposedness. It is an open problem whether they are sufficient as well. We show below, however, that either (6) or (7) 
We shall use the auxiliary results given below which were shown in [5] (see Lemmas 3.12, 3.13 and 3.14 there). We include their statements for the sake of completeness. 
for all non-negative random variables X. ✷ Lemma 3.4. Let dQ/dP, dP/dQ ∈ W , α < β and
Then there is some η > 0 satisfying η < β, α < η and δ < η, and there exist constants
for all random variables X with E Q [X] = m. ✷ Lemma 3.5. Let a, b and s be strictly positive real numbers such that s < a < b and s 1. Then there exist 0 < ζ < 1 and constants
for all non-negative random variables X. ✷ Remark 3.6. Note that in the paper [5] it was assumed that u ± , w ± are power functions (and not only comparable to power functions as in Assumption 2.2 above). Furthermore, α, β, γ, δ ≤ 1 were stipulated, in line with the literature. One can check in [5] that the proof of Lemma 3.4 above goes through without this restriction.
These Lemmas allow us to prove Theorem 3.2.
Proof of Theorem 3.2.
We imitate the proof of Theorem 3.15 in [5] . By contradiction, let us suppose that the optimisation problem is ill-posed. Then for a sequence φ(n) ∈
Note that, for any non-negative X,
Thus it follows from Lemma 3.4 (with the choice m :
for some η satisfying η < β, α < η and δ < η. Notice that
Consequently, we can apply Lemma 3.5 to conclude that also
Therefore, using Lemmas 3.4 and 3.5 again (and recalling that 0 < ζ < 1),
which is absurd. Hence, as claimed, the problem is well-posed.
We present a result about well-posedness under the alternative conditions Assumptions 2.3b and 2.4b as well. It is worth pointing out that while the conclusions of Theorems 3.2 and 3.7 are identical, the methods for proving them are significantly different. 
Proof. Notice that δ ≤ 1 and (5) imply the fourth inequality in Assumption 4.1 of [2] . Hence our result follows from Theorem 4.4 in [2] . Note that in [2] α, β, γ ≤ 1 were also assumed. As already indicated in Remark 4.2 of [2] , the proofs go through without this restriction.
From now on, the existence of optimal strategies will be our main concern. We will need to assume that the filtration is rich enough in the sense of Assumption 3.8 below. This Assumption means that investors randomize their strategies or, from a mathematical point of view, that we enlarge the underlying probability space. We will comment on this in section 4 as well. Assumption 3.8. Define G 0 = {∅, Ω}, and G t = σ(Z 1 , . . . , Z t ) for 1 ≤ t ≤ T , where the Z i , i = 1, . . . , T are R N -valued independent random variables. S 0 is constant, ∆S t is G t -adapted and B is G T -measurable.
Furthermore, F t = G t ∨ F 0 , t ≥ 0, where F 0 = σ(ε) with ε uniformly distributed on [0, 1] and independent of (Z 1 , . . . , Z T ).
Remark 3.9. The above Assumption clearly implies that ∆S t = f (t) (Z 1 , ..., Z t ) for some Borel functions f (t) , for all t, and B = g B (Z 1 , . . . , Z T ) for some Borel function g B . We may and will suppose without loss of generality that each of the Z i is bounded.
In [5] the existence of optimal strategies was shown under Assumption 2.3a (and B ∈ L 1 (Q) for some reference probability Q ∈ M e (S)) in a (narrow) class of continuoustime models. In [2] existence was shown under Assumptions 2.3b, 2.4b and 3.8 in discrete-time models assuming also the continuity of f (t) , g B . In the present paper we shall prove existence of an optimiser in discrete-time models under Assumption 3.8 and either Assumption 2.3a or Assumption 2.3b, and we do not need continuity of f (t) , g B . We first present some preparatory results.
Proposition 3.10. Let Assumptions 2.1, 2.2, 2.3a and 2.4a hold and take Q ∼ P as constructed in Lemma 3.1. Further, suppose that a sequence of trading strategies
Then there exists π > 1 such that
and sup
It follows also that
Proof. This is a direct application of Lemma 3.5. Indeed, choose 1 < s < β δ and λ such that 1 < λ < s < β δ . Applying Hölder's inequality,
where C = E Q ρ q/λ 1/q < ∞ and q is the conjugate number of λ. Lemma 3.3 yields that, for all n, 
It follows from Theorem 2 in [3] that {X z t (θ n )} t T is a martingale under Q, thus
Hence sup n E Q |X T (θ n )| < ∞ and this implies (24) as well as (26). In order to prove (25), Doob's inequality is applied, noting that f (x) = x − is convex and hence the process {(X z t (θ n )) − } t T is a positive submartingale. Notice that we could show Proposition 3.10 only in a discrete time and finite horizon setting since it relies on Theorem 2 of [3] which fails in more general (e.g. continuous-time) settings. Remark 3.11. In [5] admissible strategies θ were required to satisfy both V − (X z T (θ)) < ∞ and the martingale property for X z t (θ) (under some fixed Q ∈ M e (S)). The proof above shows that, in the present discrete-time setting, V − (X z T (θ)) < ∞ implies the martingale property for X z t (θ) under Q. So the domain of optimisation in the present paper is the same as the one in [5] . Remark 3.12. Let θ = (θ 1 , θ 2 , . . . , θ T ) ∈ A (z) be as in Proposition 3.10. Clearly,
Using the property
of conditional expectations which holds for any sigma-algebra G and for any positive random variable η, we get
Denote
, ∆S T κ T −1 and apply the (conditional) Cauchy inequality to the right-hand side:
From Assumption 2.1 and Cauchy's inequality, the right-hand side of (34) can be minorised by
thus
The same procedure applies to θ t , t = 1, . . . , T by (31). Thus, for all t,
by Assumption 2.1 and (31).
Remark 3.14. Applying Hölder's inequality, the estimates above can be carried out with no significant alteration for any 0 < ξ < 1, i.e.
can be shown. For simplicity we did this only for ξ = Proof. Lemma 9.4 of [2] provides independent random variables ε ′ ,ε, uniform on [0, 1], which are both functions of ε. Now following the proof of Theorem 6.8 of [2] verbatim (with φ 1 = . . . = φ T = 0) we obtain an F t -predictable process θ ⋆ t such that, by Prokhorov's theorem, the law of
on some probability space such that Law(
By assumption, we also have that
for all i in probability and alsoB k →B in probability, k → ∞. It follows that
in probability, hence in law. In other words, we have
in law. This finishes the proof.
Our first main result on the existence of optimal strategies now follows easily from Proposition 3.16 above. is tight. Proposition 3.16 then shows that there is a strategy
in law (along a subsequence which we assume to be the original sequence). Now our aim is to prove lim sup j V z, θ in particular, for Lebesgue-a.e. y. By Assumption 2.2,
Take 1/γ < λ < 1/α. Applying Markov's inequality and Assumption 2.2 again,
for some c ′ > 0, hence
with some c ′′ > 0. Furthermore,
The last term is finite by Assumption 2.4a. Hölder's inequality applied with p = 1 αλ
gives This estimate allows to apply Lebesgue's theorem since 
